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Abstract
This paper analyzes the implications of price-setting and incomplete ﬁnancial markets
for optimal monetary cooperation. The main objective is to provide the basic intuitions con-
cerning the role of the main international frictions on optimal policy within a simple Dy-
namic Stochastic General Equilibrium model. We concentrate on a symmetric two-country
DSGE with home bias, incomplete ﬁnancial markets internationally and imperfect compe-
tition together with nominal price rigidities in which the export prices can be denominated
either in the producer currency (PCP) or in the consumer currency (LCP). In addition, the
model can account both for efﬁcient and inefﬁcient shocks. Our main results are derived
in polar cases with efﬁcient steady state and for which the design of the optimal policy is
speciﬁcally illustrative and can be expressed in terms of targeting rules. In particular, the
paper gives some new insights on the optimal exchange rate regime given the structure of
shocks and the exchange rate pass-through, as well as on the optimal stabilization of CPI
and PPI inﬂation. We also put into perspective the implication of ﬁnancial autarky on the
optimal management of international spillovers.
Keywords: DSGE models, Optimal monetary policy, New open economy macroeconomics.
JEL classiﬁcation: E5, F4.5
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Non-Technical Summary
The main objective of this paper is to analyze simple conﬁgurations of a two-country Dy-
namic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model in which the optimal monetary coopera-
tion can be derived easily in order to illustrate the implications of international frictions. This
contribution is meant to be helpful for the analysis of optimal monetary cooperation in much
more realistic DSGE framework which are able to provide a sensible level a data coherence.
The model shares many features common in open-economy DSGE models. Exchange rate
pass-through is incomplete due to some nominal rigidity in the buyer’s currency. The speciﬁca-
tion is ﬂexible enough to continuously link the polar cases of local-currency-pricing (LCP) and
producer-currency-pricing (PCP). Financial markets are incomplete internationally and a risk
premium on external borrowing is related to the net foreign asset position. Even under ﬂex-
ible prices, purchasing power parity does not hold due to a home bias in aggregate domestic
demand. Finally, the economies can be affected by efﬁcient and inefﬁcient shocks.
The main contribution of the paper is to expand on previous studies ﬁrst by recovering and
extending in an open-economy New-Keynesian model most of the results obtained in the New
Open Economy Macroeconomics literature, and second by exposing in a uniﬁed framework
explicit targeting rules for optimal monetary cooperation for three speciﬁc conﬁgurations of
the model parameters. While such targeting rules have already been derived in the PCP case
by several authors, the LCP and ﬁnancial autarky cases constitute, to our knowledge, a novelty
within the New Keynesian literature.
Indeed, we restrict our analysis to special cases for which the optimal policy can be de-
rived analytically in terms of targeting rules. In particular, we show that the introduction of
”pricing-to-market” changes or complements previous results found in the literature. Under
LCP, the monetary authorities should target the consumer price index. A pure CPI inﬂation
targeting strategy implements the optimal outcome when shocks are efﬁcient. An analogous
result holds under PCP concerning the optimality of PPI inﬂation targeting. Moreover, a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime may be optimal under LCP in order to alleviate distortions associated
with failures of the law of one price. Under PCP, a ﬂexible exchange rate regime is optimal
following efﬁcient shocks. However, the presence of cost-push shocks reinforces the case for
exchange rate management. Finally, to explore the effect of imperfect risk sharing on optimal
cooperation, the case of ﬁnancial autarky under PCP shows that even with efﬁcient shocks the
ﬁrst best allocation cannot be achieved. This special case also provides some perspective on the6
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role of the price elasticity of trade with incomplete ﬁnancial markets, in shaping the optimal
response of international relative prices.
Overall, our analysis illustrates the lack of robustness of results about optimal monetary
policy in open economies and the importance of correctly modeling international ﬁnancial mar-
ket structure and the international price setting.7
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1 Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to analyze simple conﬁgurations of a two-country DSGE
model in which the optimal monetary cooperation can be derived easily to illustrate the impli-
cations of international frictions.
A large strand of literature aims at analyzing monetary policy in open economies. On the
one hand, the so-called ”New Open Economy Macroeconomics” (NOEM) literature, based on
the seminal papers of Obstfeld and Rogoff [2000, 1998], examines the conduct of monetary pol-
icy in a class of open economy general equilibrium models. This literature focused in particular
on the optimality of exchange rate regimes and on the welfare gains from policy coordination.
Such topics have been analyzed across a large range of model speciﬁcations. It turns out that
ﬁnancial structure, international price setting, preference parameters and nature of shocks are
key determinants. Concerning price setting schemes, part of these studies assumes that nom-
inal prices are ﬁxed in the producers’ currency, which is called ”producer-currency-pricing”
(PCP), so that prices for consumers change one-for-one in the short run with changes in the
nominal exchange rate. A number of papers are based however on models in which nomi-
nal prices are set in advance in the currency of consumers. In that case, nominal exchange
rate changes do not, in the short run, change any prices faced by consumers. It is the ”local-
currency-pricing” (LCP) assumption. Within this research agenda, some papers like Devereux
and Engel [2003] or Corsetti and Pesenti [2002] focus speciﬁcally on the connections between
price setting and optimal monetary policy. The hypothesis of complete ﬁnancial markets is re-
laxed in several papers like Obstfeld and Rogoff [2002] or Sutherland [2002] in order to analyze
the welfare gains from monetary policy coordination. Overall, the recent contribution of De-
vereux and Engel [2006] which also explore in a uniﬁed framework, the implications of price
setting and, to a certain extent, imperfect ﬁnancial markets on optimal monetary policy coop-
eration, is closely related to the analysis presented in this paper, but from a NOEM perspective
basically using a static model and a narrow ”typology” of shocks.
On the other hand, the research program initiated by Rotemberg and Woodford [1997] led
to an abundant New Keynesian literature. Whereas, in NOEM models, prices are set on a
period by period basis, leading to highly unrealistic dynamics, staggered-price-setting model
used in most of this work, has become the workhorse of monetary policy analysis in the closed
economy. Thereafter, many studies have extended the analysis to the open economy frame-8
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work. Indeed, the new generation of dynamic general equilibrium models manages to mix
tractability with a rich behavioral structure. The framework we use here is related to those
of Benigno and Benigno [2003], Clarida et al. [2002] or Gali and Monacelli [2005] who study
optimal monetary policy under PCP and with complete markets. Benigno [2004] introduces
”pricing-to-market” in a New Keynesian model but he does not perform welfare analysis nor
derive the optimal monetary policy. Smets and Wouters [2002] work on optimal monetary pol-
icy in a small open economy under LCP and incomplete ﬁnancial markets but without using
the model consistent welfare approximation.
Our paper belongs to the New Keynesian literature and illustrate the implications of differ-
ent speciﬁcations for the main international economic frictions on the optimal monetary policy
cooperation. In particular, we study the impact of price setting and imperfect risk sharing on
optimal policy. To gain more intuition on the role of those frictions, we restrict our analysis to
special cases for which the optimal policy can be analytically derived. For such speciﬁc conﬁg-
urations, we explicitly use an approximation of the welfare function assuming that subsidies
are correcting for steady state inefﬁciencies. Like in the special cases studied by Giannoni and
Woodford [2003b] for a closed economy, we derive the targeting rules which implement the
optimal monetary policy cooperation.
The model shares many features common in open-economy DSGE models. Exchange rate
pass-through is incomplete due to some nominal rigidity in the buyer’s currency. The speciﬁca-
tion is ﬂexible enough to continuously link the polar cases of local-currency-pricing (LCP) and
producer-currency-pricing (PCP). Financial markets are incomplete internationally and a risk
premium on external borrowing is related to the net foreign asset position. Even under ﬂex-
ible prices, purchasing power parity does not hold due to a home bias in aggregate domestic
demand. Finally, the economies can be affected by efﬁcient and inefﬁcient shocks.
The main contribution of the paper is to expand on both strands of literature, ﬁrst by recov-
ering and extending in an open-economy New Keynesian model most of the NOEM results,
and second by exposing in a uniﬁed framework explicit targeting rules for optimal monetary
cooperation, in the sense of Giannoni and Woodford [2003b], for three speciﬁc conﬁgurations
of the model parameters. While such targeting rules have already been derived in the PCP case
by several authors, the LCP and ﬁnancial autarky cases constitute a novelty, to our knowledge.
In addition, the computation of optimal policy in our model is consistent with the Ramsey ap-
proach to optimal monetary policy in two-country model which has been studied for example9
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by Faia and Monacelli [2004] under PCP, perfect risk sharing and inefﬁcient steady state. As
such, the optimal allocation could be easily derived in our set-up without the restrictive as-
sumptions needed to obtain analytical solutions. Up to a ﬁrst-order numerical approximation,
the same targeting rules could also be derived through the linear-quadratic approximation of
the Ramsey problem as in Benigno and Woodford [2006]. While this method presents less of
an interest in large DSGE where the intuition about the optimal design of monetary policy is
anyway hard to get, it may prove more useful in our simple cases in order to make explicit
the policy trade-offs from the second-order approximation of the welfare function. Indeed, the
contribution of this paper is also meant to be helpful for the analysis of optimal monetary co-
operation in much more realistic DSGE framework which are able to provide a sensible level a
data coherence (see for example Adj´ emian et al. [2007]).
Obviously, we show that the main features of the optimal allocation depends crucially on
the price setting schemes and on the type of shocks affecting the economies. When prices
are sticky in the producer’s currency, we revisit, in a slightly different model, the results of
Benigno and Benigno [2006] about the optimal monetary policy and the optimal exchange rate
regime. Under speciﬁc assumptions and with efﬁcient shocks, pure producer price inﬂation
targeting policies achieve the ﬁrst best allocation. The nominal exchange rate is thus free to
adjust to the required ﬂuctuations of the terms of trade. Nevertheless, with inefﬁcient shocks
and ﬁnancial imperfections, the monetary authorities face additional tradeoffs and the ﬁrst best
allocation cannot be achieved. In that context, exchange rate ﬂuctuations can worsen some
policy tradeoffs so that it may be optimal to limit exchange rate movements. We show that, in
presence of inefﬁcient shocks, a ﬁxed exchange rate regime is even fully optimal under some
parameter restrictions.
These results are not robust to modiﬁcations of the price setting assumptions. As previ-
ously emphasized in the literature (see Devereux and Engel [2003] for example), the presence of
local-currency-pricing, duetotheabsenceofdirectexchangeratepass-through, impliesthatthe
monetary authorities cannot inﬂuence directly the internal terms of trade (see Benigno [2004]
for a similar result). Without home bias in national consumption, it can even be shown that
terms of trade are independent from monetary policy. Therefore, independently from the shock
typology, the monetary authorities cannot manage to completely stabilize the producer inﬂa-
tionratesandtheoutputgaps. Moreover, LCPintroducesinthemodelanadditionaldistortion:
with no preference bias, the purchasing-power-parity does not hold and real exchange rate10
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variations induce undesirable volatility in relative consumption. So monetary policies should
aim at limiting such movements by targeting directly the consumer price indexes. In particu-
lar, we show that under some assumptions, the optimal monetary cooperation under LCP is
a “lean against the wind” strategy that adjusts the “consumption gaps” to the consumer-price
level ﬂuctuations. The derivation of those targeting rules is one of the main contribution of
the paper. Following efﬁcient shocks, it is feasible and optimal to close the consumption gaps
and to fully stabilize the consumer-price levels. Furthermore, the predictions about the optimal
choice of an exchange rate regime from the PCP case are strongly modiﬁed by the LCP assump-
tion. The failure of the law of one price creates new incentives for the monetary authorities to
control the exchange rate ﬂuctuations even with efﬁcient shocks.
Finally, in order to explore the effect of imperfect risk sharing on optimal cooperation, we
consider the case of ﬁnancial autarky under PCP. This special case allows us to go beyond Be-
nigno [2001] who did not expose analytical solutions for the optimal policy under imperfect
risk sharing and PCP. Such extreme ﬁnancial market imperfections highlights the associated
policy trade-offs: even efﬁcient shocks act as cost-push shocks, pushing inﬂation rates in oppo-
site directions and preventing to achieve the ﬁrst best allocation. This special case also provides
some perspective on the role of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution with incomplete ﬁ-
nancial markets in shaping the optimal response of international relative prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the theoretical model is derived.
Section 3 presents the simple cases for which the Ramsey problem associated with the optimal
monetary cooperation can be formulated to illustrate of the implications of international price
setting and international ﬁnancial frictions in particular. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
The world economy is composed of two symmetric countries: Home and Foreign. In each
country, there is a continuum of “single-good-ﬁrms” indexed on [0,1], producing differenti-
ated goods that are imperfect substitutes. The number of households is proportional to the
number of ﬁrms. Consumers receive utility from consumption and disutility from labor. In
each country, the consumption baskets aggregating products from both countries have biased
preferences towards locally produced goods. Households have identical preferences across
countries.11
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On the labor market, wages are fully ﬂexible. Firms are monopolistic competitors, produce
differentiated products and set prices on a staggered basis ` a la Calvo (1983). Concerning inter-
national frictions, we assume that ﬁnancial markets are complete domestically but incomplete
internationally. Moreover export prices are sticky in the producer currency for a fraction of
ﬁrms and in the buyer currency for the rest. Financial markets are complete domestically but
incomplete internationally. In that context, we show that households are identical with respect
to their consumption and labor supply choices.
Not only can the economies be affected by efﬁcient shocks (technological shocks). But it
is also possible to introduce inefﬁcient shocks that lead to a short run inﬂation/output gap
tradeoff for the conduct of monetary policy. In our model, we might rationalize those shocks
as markup ﬂuctuations in the goods market (due to time varying ﬁrm-revenue taxes).
For the sake of clarity, most of the derivation will be pursued for country H. Analogous
relations hold for country F.
2.1 Consumer’s program

























Households obtain utility from consumption of a distribution good Ch
t , relative to an internal
habit depending on past consumption, while receiving disutility from its labor services Lh
t . ˜ L
is a positive scale parameter.
Financial markets are incomplete internationally. As assumed generally in the literature,
Home households can trade two nominal risk-less bonds denominated in the domestic and
foreign currency. A risk premium as a function of real holdings of the foreign assets in the
entire economy, is introduced on international ﬁnancing of Home consumption expenditures.
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where Wh
t is the wage, St is the nominal exchange rate, TTh
t are government transfers.
Finally, Bh
H,t and Bh
F,t are the individuals holding of domestic and foreign bonds denominated
in local currency. The risk premium function Ψ(•) is differentiable, decreasing and veriﬁes
Ψ(0) = 1.
Finally, separability of preferences and complete ﬁnancial markets domestically ensure that
households have identical consumption plans.




where Λt is the lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
























where Rt and R∗
t are one-period-ahead nominal interest rates for country H and F respectively.
The previous equations imply an arbitrage condition on bond prices which corresponds to
















































Thereafter, the functional forms used for the risk premium is given by Ψ(X) = exp(−2χX).
2.2 Labor supply and wage setting
In country H, each household is a monopoly supplier of a differentiated labor service. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that he sells his services to a perfectly competitive ﬁrm which13
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transforms it into an aggregate labor input using a CES technology Lt =






where μw = θw
θw−1 and θw > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor







μw−1 Lt, where Wt =





is the aggregate wage rate.
Wt(h) is chosen to maximize the intertemporal utility under the budget constraint and the
labor demand for wage setters and the ﬁrst order condition of this program is:
μw˜ LL
σl
t =Λ twt (5)
where wt denotes the real wage.
Therefore, the real wage is equal to a markup μw over the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and labor.
2.3 Optimal risk sharing
It is worth examining the case of complete asset market structure because our deﬁnition of the
ﬂexible price equilibrium will assume that ﬁnancial markets are also complete internationally.
In that case, households in both countries are allowed to trade in the contingent one-period













state assumptions). The previous equation is derived from the set of optimality conditions that
characterize the optimal allocation of wealth among state-contingent securities.
When markets are complete, it is no use evaluating the current account path in order to
determine the relative consumption dynamics. Consumption levels in both countries differ
only to the extent that the real exchange rate deviates from purchasing power parity (PPP). In
our model, those deviations are allowed for by two assumptions. The ﬁrst one is the preference
bias for locally produced goods, implying that the real exchange rate depends on the terms of
trade. The second one is the possibility that prices might not be denominated in the producer
currency, which generates failures of the law of one price.14
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2.4 Distribution sector
A continuum of companies operating under perfect competition mixes local production with
imports. There is a home bias in the aggregation, which pins down the degree of openness in
































where ξ is the elasticity of substitution between bundles YH and YF. We denote PH and PF the
price of locally produced goods and imports in country H,and P∗
F and P∗
H the corresponding
price indexes for country F.
Cost minimization determines import demands.
YH,t = n(TH,t)
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2.5 Final goods sector
In country H, ﬁnal producers for local sales and imports are in perfect competition and ag-
gregate a continuum of differentiated intermediate products from home and foreign interme-
diate sector. YH and YF are sub-indexes of the continuum of differentiated goods produced
respectively in country H and F. The elementary differentiated goods are imperfect substi-
tutes with elasticity of substitution denoted
μ
μ−1. Final goods are produced with the following
technology YH =











. In the country F, the correspond-
ing indexes are given by Y ∗
F =












. For a domestic15
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product h, we denote p(h) its price on local market and p¤(h) its price on the foreign import
market. The domestic-demand-based price indexes associated with imports and local mar-



























: And domestic demand is allocated







































8h 2 [0;1], Yt(h) = "A
t Lt(h)
8f 2 [0;1], Y ¤





t are exogenous technology parameters. Each ﬁrm sells its products in the
local market and in the foreign market. We denote YH(h) and Y ¤
H(h) (respectively Y ¤
F(f) and
YF(f)) the local and foreign sales of domestic producer h (respectively foreign producer f) and
we deﬁne LH(h) and L¤
H(h) (respectively L¤
F(f) and LF(f)) the corresponding labor demand.
Firms are monopolistic competitors and produce differentiated products. For local sales,
ﬁrms set prices on a staggered basis ` a la Calvo (1983). In each period, a ﬁrm h (resp. f) faces a
constant probability 1 ¡ ®H (resp. 1 ¡ ®¤
F) of being able to re-optimize its nominal price. This
probability is independent across ﬁrms and time in a same country. The average duration of
a rigidity period is 1
1¡®H (resp. 1
1¡®¤
F ). If a ﬁrm cannot re-optimize its price, the price evolves
according to the following simple rule:
pt(h) = pt¡1(h)
As the distribution of prices among the share ®H of producers unable to re-optimize at t is
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¤tPt+j isthemarginalvalueofoneunitofmoneytothesaverhouseholds. MCt+j
is the real marginal cost deﬂated by the producer-price for local sales and ¿t is a time-varying







In our model, all ﬁrms that can re-optimize their price at time t choose the same level.




















































When the probability of being able to change prices tends towards unity, this implies that
the ﬁrm sets its price equal to a markup
¹
(1¡¿t) over marginal cost. The time varying tax on
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Concerning exports, we assume that, in country H, a fraction ´ (respectively ´¤ in coun-
try F) of exporters exhibit producer-currency-pricing (PCP) while the remaining ﬁrms exhibit
local-currency-pricing (LCP). Consequently, aggregate export prices denominated in foreign

















































Let us deﬁne the following relative prices R ~ ERH =
S ~ P¤
H
PH ; R ~ ERF =
~ PF
SP¤
F and ~ T =
~ PF
PH.
Export margins relative to local sales are denoted RERH =
SP¤
H
PH and RERF =
PF
SP¤
F : If there is
some form of international price discrimination, those ratios ﬁgure the relative proﬁtability of
foreign sales compared with the local ones. RERt =
StP¤
t
Pt is the real exchange rate measured
with the consumer price indexes.
LCP exporters also set their prices on a staggered basis and face the same nominal rigidities
as the local producers.
Consequently, the inﬂation dynamics of LCP export prices for the country H, ~ ¦¤
H;t; is de-
scribed by the following three equations
~ Z¤
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LCP export price inﬂation for country F, ˜ ΠF,t, is given by the equivalent formulation











˜ ZF2,t =( 1− τ∗
t )Λ∗
tYF,tT∗



















2.7 Market clearing conditions










where Lt and L∗
t are the labor input.
Market clearing conditions in goods markets lead to the following relations
Zt = nΔH,t(TH,t)

























































μ−1 df measure price dispersions among products of country H and F, sold
locally or exported. Those indexes have the following dynamics
































H,t = ηΔH,t +( 1− η) ˜ Δ∗
H,t (26)
˜ Δ∗
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ΔF,t = η∗Δ∗
F,t +( 1− η∗)Δ F,t (28)












Equilibrium in the bond markets implies thatBF,t+B∗
F,t =0and BH,t+B∗
H,t =0 . Moreover,






















H,t − Yt (30)
We abstracted here from the risk premium in the accumulation equation for the net foreign
assets. Up to a ﬁrst order approximation, this modiﬁcation is neutral but at a second order, it
brings some symmetry in the effect of ﬁnancial market imperfections on the stochastic steady
state for each country.
Some relative prices have ﬁnally to be deﬁned as a function of stationary variables. First,
the 4 inﬂation rates for export prices and local sales prices determine 3 relative prices: 2 relative
export margins for LCP producers and internal terms of trade for country H.














The following variables are deduced from the previous three relative prices.
RERH,t =
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The competitive equilibrium is a set of stationary 18 processes for country H, Zt, Ct, Λt, Lt,
MCt, Πt, Π∗






ogous 18 processes for country F, 9 relative prices R ˜ ERH,t, R ˜ ERF,t, RERH,t, RERF,t, RERt,
Tt, T∗
t , TH,t, T∗
F,t and the depreciation rate ΔSt. The 46 stationary processes satisfy the relations
(1)-(43) and the analogous of equations (1), (2), (5) for country F, given exogenous stochastic
processes for country H, εA
t , εP
t with the analogous shocks for country F, Rt, R∗
t, initial con-
ditions for country H, C−1ΔH,−1, ˜ Δ∗
H,−1, ΠH,−1, ˜ Π∗
H,−1, w−1, analogous initial conditions for
country F, and R ˜ ERH,−1, R ˜ ERF,−1, T−1.
2.9 The Ramsey formulation of optimal monetary policy cooperation
As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2005], we assume that the monetary authorities have been
operating for an inﬁnite number of periods and will honor commitment made in the past when
choosing their optimal policies. This form of policy commitment is similar to the notion of
optimality from a timeless perspective in the sense of Woodford [2003]
We deﬁne the Ramsey policy as the monetary policies under commitment which maximize
the joint sum of intertemporal households’ welfare for country H and country F. Formally, the
Ramsey equilibrium is a set of 46 processes deﬁned in the competitive equilibrium for t ≥ 0
that maximize
WWorld,0 = WH,0 + WF,021
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subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions (1)-(43) and the analogous of equations (1),
(2), (5) for country F, ∀t  − ∞ , given exogenous stochastic processes and the initial values
of the variables listed above dated t ≺ 0, as well as the values of the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the constraints listed above dated t ≺ 0.
The Ramsey formulation of optimal monetary policy cooperation is therefore computed by
formulating an inﬁnite-horizon Lagrangian problem of maximizing the conditional expected
social welfare subject to the full set of non-linear constraints forming the competitive equilib-
rium of the model. The ﬁrst order conditions to this problem could easily be obtained using
symbolic Matlab procedures. This approach would in principle be useful to derive the optimal
policy in the general case, with inefﬁcient steady state and the full set of frictions described
above. The Ramsey approach to optimal monetary policy in a two-country model with PCP
and perfect risk sharing has been studied by Faia and Monacelli [2004].
However, the potential drawback of this tractable approach to compute optimal policy in
general modeling frameworks, is the lack of transparency on the policy trade-offs embodied
in the model and on the optimal resolution of them. In this paper, we precisely intend to give
more insight on the implications of international friction for optimal monetary policy coopera-
tion: we study some particular cases for which a ﬁrst order approximation of the Ramsey solu-
tion can be written in terms of targeting rules like the ones Giannoni and Woodford [2003a,b]
obtained in a closed-economy set-up.
Up to a ﬁrst-order numerical approximation, the same targeting rules could be derived
through the linear-quadratic approximation of the Ramsey problem as in Benigno and Wood-
ford [2006]. While this method presents less of an interest in large DSGE where the intuition
about the optimal design of monetary policy would anyway be difﬁcult to gain from the linear-
quadratic formulation of the Ramsey problem, it may prove more useful in our simple cases in
order to make explicit the policy trade-offs from the second-order approximation of the welfare
function.
In the rest of the paper, we will also expose the linear-quadratic approximation of the Ram-
sey problem to illustrate the properties of optimal monetary policy cooperation.22
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3 Simple cases
Our approach is mainly illustrative: the inﬂuence of price setting and incomplete ﬁnancial
markets on optimal monetary policy is studied through highly stylized model conﬁgurations
in which analytical solutions can be derived. Our main contribution here is to examine in a uni-
ﬁed framework the optimal monetary cooperation, under PCP versus LCP, with complete or
incomplete ﬁnancial market, under efﬁcient versus inefﬁcient shocks. Some papers are closely
related to our analysis. Clarida et al. [2002] studied the welfare gains from international co-
operation under PCP within a slightly different model. Results exposed in this section under
PCP are very close to the analysis of Benigno and Benigno [2006] who studied a two-country
New Keynesian model under perfect risk sharing, PCP and no home bias. With imperfect ex-
change rate pass-through, Smets and Wouters [2002] give some results about optimal monetary
policy in a small open economy. Within NOEM studies, we extend and ﬁnd similar results as
Devereux and Engel [2006] who used a static framework where price are set one period in ad-
vance. Benigno [2001] examined optimal monetary policy in model with incomplete ﬁnancial
markets and PCP but did not cover the ﬁnancial autarky case and the analytical solution for
optimal policy which is presented here. Overall, we propose a uniﬁed treatment of a large
range of issues. In particular, it is shown through the exposition of optimal targeting rules that
international price setting matters concerning the choice of the price deﬂator for the inﬂation
objective. Moreover, results on optimal exchange rate regime found in the NOEM literature are
generalized in some directions.
In the following, we restrict the analysis to the case of efﬁcient steady state which allows us
to easily approximate the Ramsey problem by a linear-quadratic one, relying only on the ﬁrst
order expansion of the structural constraints to derive the second-order approximation of the
aggregate welfare.
Thefullysymmetricdeterministsteadystate, aroundwhichwewilllog-linearizethemodel,
is associated with the case where all shocks are held at their unconditional mean, subsidies
offsetting the monopolistic distortions in goods and labor markets, and net foreign assets are
zero. Inﬂation rates are null in the Ramsey steady state. All price levels are equalized. In that
context, PPP does hold and all macroeconomic aggregates are the same across countries. In
what follows, lower case letters stand for the logarithmic deviation from steady state.23
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3.1 The ﬂexible price equilibrium
Theeconomiesareaffectedby”efﬁcient”shocksliketechnologicalshocksandinefﬁcientshocks
that lead in particular to a short run inﬂation/output gap tradeoff for the conduct of monetary
policy. In this stylized model, those shocks are only rationalized through markup ﬂuctuations
in the goods market (following time-varying tax rates).
In the ﬂexible price allocation, only efﬁcient shocks are introduced. Moreover, ﬁnancial
markets are assumed to be complete in the ﬂexible price equilibrium. As we will see later, such
a deﬁnition of the ﬂexible price equilibrium is consistent with the welfare-relevant gaps (i.e.
log-deviation of an actual variable from its ﬂexible price counterpart) for output, consumption
and terms-of-trade.
In the absence of price stickiness, the allocation is independent of monetary policy and all
ﬁrms set prices equal to a constant markup over marginal cost while real wages equal marginal
rates of substitution between hours and consumption. Moreover, as the demand elasticity of
the differentiated intermediate goods is the same for local sales and exports, ﬁrms have no
incentive to discriminate and the law of one price holds. The ﬂexible allocation is therefore
strictly independent from the price setting rules. Consequently, internal terms of trade are
equalized across countries and relative export margins remain constant.
As we will see, the sticky price supply curves depend on the ﬂexible price equilibrium. So it
is convenient to indicate with a “−” over a variable a ﬂexible price allocation. Moreover, since
the model is easily solved in terms of aggregate and relative variable, we deﬁne for any variable
X, XW = X+X∗
2 and XR = X−X∗

























terms of trade tt = 1+σL
1/2+ϑσLaR
t
with ϑ =2 n(1 − n)ξ +
(2n−1)2
2σC .
In the following a hat over a variable indicates the absolute deviation from its ﬂexible price
value. For example,   zW = zW − zW is the world output gap.24
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3.2 Redundant ﬁnancial markets
Thereafter, we denote the efﬁcient optimal risk-sharing gap, i.e. the gap that should be closed
under optimal risk sharing, by 2σC   cR
t −   rert, where σC   cR
t = σC   cR
t − (n − 1/2)  tW
t and   rert =
  rert − (2n − 1)ˆ tW
t .
Making use of the Euler equations for both countries and the modiﬁed uncovered interest





t+1 −   rert+1
 
= −χbt
where χ = −Ψ 
X (0)C/2 and bt is the percentage deviation from steady state of the net foreign
assets of country H.
The ﬁrst-order approximation of the net foreign assets dynamics can then be written as




σC   cR
t −   rert/2
 
+( 1− n)(1− 1/σC)   rert
+2 K  tW
t +2 Ktt
where K = n(1 − n)(ξ − 1 )+( 1− n)(n − 1/2)(1 − 1/σC).
Using the previous two equations, we see that ﬁnancial markets are redundant in the model
when ξ =1and σC =1 , or under PCP (implying that   rert =0 ), when ξ =1and n =1 /2.I n
both cases, with zero initial net foreign assets, the economy behaves as if ﬁnancial markets
were complete and 2σC   cR
t −   rert =0at all times. Therefore, those assumptions will make
irrelevant imperfections in the international ﬁnancial markets for the international monetary
policy cooperation. This point is well known in the NOEM literature (see for example, Corsetti
and Pesenti [2001]).
3.3 Quadratic approximation of the aggregate welfare
We take a second order approximation of the aggregate welfare function WWorld,t around a
steady state in which taxation subsidies completely offset the monopolistic distortions in both
countries and both markets. In this context, the ﬂexible price allocation is the ﬁrst best solution
and there are no ﬁrst order terms in the second-order expansion of the welfare function.
By neglecting terms independent from monetary policy, we can show that1
1The fully-ﬂedge derivation is similar to the one exposed by Darracq Pari` es [2003] within a closely related frame-
work.25
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We therefore approximate the Ramsey problem deﬁned in previous section by the linear-
quadratic one which maximizes this intertemporal welfare function under the structural equa-
tions of the model. Note that, up to a ﬁrst order approximation, the solution of the linear-
quadratic problem is the same as the one of the Ramsey problem presented in section 2.9.
Even in this simple framework, monetary authorities face numerous tradeoffs. First, in-
efﬁcient shocks induce mechanically an inﬂation/output gap tradeoff. Second, under LCP
incomplete pass-through, it is impossible to both stabilize export margins and internal terms of
trade misalignments. Finally, ﬁnancial imperfections introduce an additional wedge in the risk
sharing conditions so that real exchange rate and relative consumption stabilization become
conﬂicting objectives.
Therefore, in general, under imperfect pass-through and incomplete ﬁnancial markets, the
optimal cooperative policy cannot achieve the ﬁrst best allocation.The optimal plan always
requires adjusting gradually the price levels and the nominal exchange rate.
We now turn to special cases highlighting the impact of different frictions on optimal mon-
etary cooperation. The point is not to present a comprehensive analysis of the optimal policies
but instead to develop illustrative conﬁgurations conveying the qualitative features.
3.4 The producer-currency-pricing case
Under producer-currency-pricing in both countries (η =1and η∗ =1 , implying   rert =0 ),
elementary algebra shows that the dynamics of the world economy can be summarized by the
following relationships:26
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βbt = bt−1 − 2(1− n)  cR
t +2 K  tt +2 Ktt (BOP)
πH,t = βEtπH,t+1 + λH
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(σC + σL)  zW





  tt =   tt−1 +Δ st + π∗
F,t − πH,t − Δtt (TT)
σC   cR
t = σC   cR
t − (n − 1/2)  tt














In this reduced form, all state variables are written in deviation from its ﬂexible-price path
and efﬁcient shocks are introduced in the model through the ﬂexible-price path of terms of
trade.
The terms of trade misalignments (i.e. in deviation from the ﬂexible price path) play a
key role in this model driving a wedge between the inﬂation rates in both countries. They
enter the aggregate supply equations through two different channels. First, workers negotiate
on real wage measured with the consumer price index whereas producer price inﬂation rate
depends on real wage measured with the producer price index. So when the price of foreign
goods increases, workers wants higher salaries to compensate from lower real income, which
pushes up local producer prices. Second, the expenditure-switching effect reﬂects the fact that
an increase in the price of goods produced in one country relative to goods produced in the
other boosts the demand for goods produced in the latter and hours worked by residents.
They claim for higher wage so that producer inﬂation increases in this country. Notice that
under complete ﬁnancial markets (i.e. ˜ cR
t =0 ), the introduction of home bias in the model
does not change fundamentally the structure of the reduced form under PCP. It magniﬁes the
expenditure-switching effect through the impact of terms of trade on relative consumption, as
we see in the elasticity ϑ =2 n(1 − n)ξ +
(2n−1)2
2σC .
Finally, under incomplete ﬁnancial markets, net foreign assets imbalance introduces a risk
premium in the uncovered interest rate parity and drives a wedge between relative consump-
tion and real exchange rate. In addition, the optimal risk-sharing gap enters real marginal costs
in country H and F with opposite signs.27
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The welfare function also simpliﬁes to





































With complete ﬁnancial markets, it even gives



























This expression of the aggregate welfare function can also be related to what Benigno and
Benigno [2003] obtain under some similar model assumptions. One minor contribution here
is to allow for some degree of home bias in national consumption. Under PCP, this assump-
tion increases the distortions associated with terms of trade misalignments: terms of trade
affects relative output both through the traditional expenditure switching effect and through
its impact on real exchange rate. Under complete ﬁnancial markets, the social cost of those
deviations are analogous to what we would ﬁnd in model without preference bias but where
the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is given by ϑ =2 n(1 − n)ξ +
(2n−1)2
2σC .
In that sense, the fundamental channels through which terms of trade affect the welfare
function are not qualitatively modiﬁed by the home bias hypothesis: terms of trade misalign-
ments are costly due to its impact on relative output gap and on relative labor supply.
The following result presents the targeting rules for optimal monetary policy cooperation.
Result 1 Under PCP, the optimal policies are determined by the following equations
μ
μ − 1




F,t = −Δ  z∗
t
if and only if
(i) ﬁnancial markets are complete, or
(ii) incomplete ﬁnancial markets and ξ =1and σC =1 , or
(iii) incomplete ﬁnancial markets and ξ =1and n =1 /2.
The design of the targeting rules is essentially valid under complete markets or when ﬁ-
nancial markets are redundant. In that case, not only do the monetary authorities choose the28
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same optimal strategy as under complete markets, but they also achieve the same allocation.
Benigno and Benigno [2006] provide a generalization of those targeting rules under perfect risk
sharing and no home bias to the case of inefﬁcient steady state.
Corollary 1 Under the conditions stated in the previous result and following efﬁcient shocks, the
optimal cooperative policy achieves the ﬂexible price allocation: there is no volatility of inﬂation and
output gaps are closed. In that case, pure inﬂation targeting policies implement the optimal solution.
Inpresenceofcost-pushshocks, themonetaryauthoritiesfaceatradeoffbetweenstabilizing
the output gap or the inﬂation rate which prevents the optimal policy to reach the ﬁrst best
allocation.
Let us consider the behavior of the exchange rate under the optimal monetary policy co-
operation. Following efﬁcient shocks, the optimal policy replicates the ﬂexible price allocation.
Therefore, astheinﬂationratesareequaltozeroandthe”termsoftradegap”isclosed, equation
TT shows that the nominal exchange rate has to adjust to the required terms of trade path un-
der ﬂexible prices. However, in presence of inefﬁcient shocks, the associated inﬂation/output
gap tradeoff does not allow to fully stabilize the economies. The optimal monetary cooperation
targets the producer price levels and the nominal exchange rate. A ﬁxed exchange rate regime
might even be optimal.
Result 2 Under the assumptions of Result 1 and following efﬁcient shocks, it is optimal to let the
exchange rate freely adjust to the efﬁcient ﬂuctuations of international relative prices. Otherwise, an




Proof: combining the optimal policies and equation TT, and making use of ˆ yR
t = ϑˆ tt, it is easy
to show that the inﬂation rate differential realizes exactly the required terms of trade adjustment if
μ
μ−1 =2 ϑ, leaving no role for exchange rate variations.
Overall, beyond the introduction of home bias, the results exposed here are similar to what
is exposed in Benigno [2001] with incomplete risk sharing or Benigno and Benigno [2003] with
perfect risk sharing. We are now going to illustrate more precisely the role of imperfect risk
sharing on optimal monetary policy coordination in the extreme case of ﬁnancial autarky.29
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3.5 Producer-currency-pricing and ﬁnancial autarky
When the elasticity of the exchange risk premium with respect to net foreign assets χ goes to
inﬁnity, it becomes too expensive for agents to buy foreign bonds and, as a limit case, net for-
eign assets in both countries are permanently null. In this context, we can express the equation
BOP in the following way:
cR
t =( nξ − 1/2)tt
Compared with the perfect risk sharing relation σCcR
t =( n − 1/2)tt, the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution ξ affects the correlation between relative consumption and the terms-
of-trade. This correlation can be either positive or negative depending on ξ>ξ 1= 1
2n or ξ<ξ 1.
Similarly, the relation between relative output and the terms-of-trade is given by
zR
t =( nξ − (n − 1/2))tt
Here again, in comparison with the perfect risk sharing equivalent zR
t = ϑtt where ϑ>0,
the correlation between relative output and the terms-of-trade is positive when ξ>ξ 2=2n−1
2n
and negative otherwise.
Corsetti et al. [2005] illustrate the role of the price elasticity of tradable goods under in-
complete markets on the sign of the international transmission and of the correlation between
relative consumption and real exchange rates. Within a simple endowment economy, they
highlight the role of the cutoff point ξ2 for the price elasticity, on the equilibrium volatility of
the terms-of-trade. When ξ gets closer to ξ2, the volatility of the terms-of-trade increases in
response to relative output shocks, implying that there will be two values of ξ with opposite
international transmission sign, which could yield the same volatility level. Moreover, since
ξ1 >ξ 2, the value of ξ associated with positive international transmission could also imply
negative correlation between relative consumption and the real exchange rate. In our frame-
work, with elastic supply curves and nominal rigidities, such cutoff point will obviously not
be the same.
In the following, we are going to investigate the design of optimal monetary policy cooper-
ation under PCP and ﬁnancial autarky. This special case provides some perspective on the role
of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution with incomplete ﬁnancial markets.
Given ﬁnancial autarky, we can re-write the marginal costs so that the reduced form of the
model becomes30
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πH,t = βEtπH,t+1 + λH
 
(σC + σL)  zW
t + A  tt
 






(σC + σL)  zW





  tt =   tt−1 +Δ st + π∗
F,t − πH,t − Δtt (TT)
where A =( 1− n)+σC (nξ − 1/2)+σL (nξ − (n − 1/2)).
As in the perfect risk sharing case, the terms-of-trade gap drives a wedge between the inﬂa-
tion rates of both countries (see equations ASHA and ASFA). However, with ﬁnancial autarky,
the elasticity of the real marginal cost with respect to the terms-of-trade A can be negative
for ξ<ξ 3=ξ2+
(1−n)(σC−1)
nσC+nσL .ξ 3 would represent the cutoff point of Corsetti et al. [2005] in our
framework with ﬁnancial autarky and ﬂexible prices. With nominal rigidity, such value for ξ
depends also on monetary policy.
The extreme ﬁnancial market imperfections we consider in this section provides an illus-
tration of the associated policy trade-offs: even following efﬁcient shocks, the ﬂexible-price
terms-of-trade acts as cost-push shocks, pushing inﬂation rates in opposite directions. This in-
troduces an additional trade-off between the stabilization of inﬂation rates and output gaps in
particular.
Under ﬁnancial autarky, the welfare function can be written as follows





+ B  t2






















B = n(1 − n)ξ+σC (nξ − 1/2)
2 +σL (nξ − (n − 1/2))
2
C =[ ( nξ − 1/2 )+( nξ − (n − 1/2))(2n − 1)]
K
1 − n
Note that B > 0 but C can potentially be either sign.















= −BΔ  tt −CΔtt31
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The targeting rules for optimal monetary policy cooperation are the same as the ones of
Result 1 when B
A = ϑ and C =0 . This is the case when ξ =1and σC =1or when ξ =1and
n =1 /2. The second targeting rule of Result 3 shows that, depending on the sign of A, the
inﬂation differential should be adjusted positively or negatively to the changes in the terms-of-
trade gap.
Concerning the exchange rate adjustment, we can show numerically that there is a cutoff
point for ξ around which the response of nominal exchange rate changes sign. This point does
not coincide with ξ3 in general. Besides, as in Result 2, we can easily show that following




Up to our knowledge, such an exposition of the ﬁnancial autarky case is new in the lit-
erature on optimal policy in DSGE models and presents enlightening illustration of the role
played by incomplete markets on optimal monetary policy cooperation. Benigno [2001] in par-
ticular did not derive any analytical solution in its treatment of optimal policy under imperfect
ﬁnancial markets.
We now turn to the local-currency-pricing case.
3.6 The local-currency-pricing case
In this section, results obtained by Devereux and Engel [2003, 2006] are partly revisited and ex-
tended, notably to the case of cost-push shocks. Our main contribution here is to derive explicit
optimal targeting rules under the LCP assumption and examine the optimality of exchange rate
regimes according to the typology of shocks.
The LCP hypothesis introduces two additional distortions in the model. First of all, the
nominal exchange rate doesn’t affect the internal terms of trade directly. Thus, the expenditure-
switching role of exchange rate is dampened by the stickiness of import prices: internal terms
of trade are almost immune from monetary policy. However, exchange rate impacts instanta-
neously the relative export margins of producers, which induces some second round effects on
inﬂation rates. This transmission mechanism conveys a second source of distortion. The vari-
ability of relative export margins implies some undesirable ﬂuctuations of the real exchange
rate. Of course, under PCP, the real exchange rate moves in line with the terms of trade when
there is a home bias in the national consumption. But under LCP, there is an additional source
of deviation from PPP. This further deteriorates the international consumption risk sharing.
Unlike the PCP case, it turns out that the LCP model is signiﬁcantly modiﬁed by the home32
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bias assumption. In particular, it changes the qualitative impact of internal terms of trade and
relative export margins on real marginal costs. Consequently, it may be helpful to restrain the
analysis to a no home bias case.
Under this restriction, the only state variables of the model are the world consumption gap
(note that ˆ cW
t =ˆ yW
t ), the real exchange rate and the CPI inﬂation rates. The dynamics of the











σC   cR
t − rert/2
 
+1 /2(1− 1/σC)rert +2 K  tt +2 Ktt (LBOP)
πt = βEtπt+1 + λH
 














rert = rert−1 +Δ st + π∗
t − πt (RER)




























Given the aggregate output gap, internal terms of trade misalignments have no impact on
consumer price indexes, but they still push away import prices from producer prices. Under
LCP, there is no direct pass-through of nominal exchange rate on internal terms of trade. The
immediate transmission mechanism of exchange rate relies on its impact on relative export
margins and on the real exchange rate. Precisely, it is now the real exchange rate that pushes
the inﬂation rates in opposite directions through the modiﬁed aggregate supply curves. This
canonical representation of the economy under LCP will be useful in drawing the intuition
about the properties of the optimal policy. Since the real exchange rate determines relative con-
sumption, we can already notice that, compared to the PCP reduced-form model, CPI inﬂation
rates and consumption gaps replace PPI inﬂation rates and output gaps as the fundamental
state variables driving the economy.
Result4Theinternalterms oftrade andthe netforeignassetsareindependentfrommonetarypolicy
if and only if
(i) ﬁnancial markets are complete and n =1 /2,o r
(ii) ﬁnancial markets are incomplete, n =1 /2 and σC =1 .33
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Proof: Subtract equation the producer and import price setting equations in both countries, and
replace the inﬂation rate differentials by the internal terms of trade dynamic equations. Furthermore,
injecting LRS in LBOP to substitute for the term ˜ cR
t − rert/2, one easily obtains three relations linking
the internal terms of trade gaps and the net foreign assets to exogenous shocks.
In that case, it becomes clear that monetary policy cannot stabilize both producer prices
and import prices (due to imperfect pass-through), and both relative consumption and real
exchange rate (due to incomplete markets). This property was also singled out by Benigno
[2004].
Since monetary policy has no control on internal terms of trade and therefore on inﬂation
differentials πF,t − πH,t and π∗
F,t − π∗
H,t, the loss function boils down to

























As the real exchange rate is directly connected to the consumption in the case of complete
ﬁnancial markets, the reduced form of the structural equations and the previous loss function
seem to indicate that monetary authorities cannot do better than stabilizing the CPI inﬂation
rates and the consumption gaps. This intuition is conﬁrmed by the following result.
Result 5 The optimal cooperative policies is given by
μ
μ − 1




t = −Δ  c∗
t
if and only if
(i) ﬁnancial markets are complete and n =1 /2,o r
(ii) ﬁnancial markets are incomplete, n =1 /2 and σC =1 .
Whereas, under producer-currency-pricing, the monetary authorities adjust the producer
price inﬂation rate in response to the output gap ﬂuctuations, when prices are set in the con-
sumer currency, it is optimal to adjust the consumer price level to the variation of the ”con-
sumption gap”. We have already seen that monetary policy has no impact on inﬂation differ-
ential between import price and producer price and cannot alleviate the distortions associated
with terms of trade misalignments. Consequently, monetary stabilization works only on global
consumption gap (equal to the aggregate output gap), the real exchange rate and the CPI inﬂa-
tion rates.34
ECB
Working Paper Series No 834
November 2007
Note that under incomplete ﬁnancial markets, the conditions n =1 /2 and σC =1do not
implythatmonetaryauthoritiesachievethesameallocationthanundercompletemarkets. This
would only be the case for ξ =1which leads to redundant asset markets.
The derivation of the targeting rules under LCP is a novelty of our paper. Benigno [2004]
touched upon many issues related to the effect of imperfect pass-through on the macroeco-
nomic transmission of shocks and on exchange rate persistence but he did not investigate the
welfare approximation nor the optimal policy.
Corollary 2 Following efﬁcient shocks, the optimal solution consists in completely stabilizing the
consumer price levels and closing the consumption gaps if and only if
(i) ﬁnancial markets are complete and n =1 /2,o r
(ii) ﬁnancial markets are incomplete, n =1 /2,σ C =1and ξ =1 .
Pure CPI inﬂation targeting implements the optimal policy.
Proof: Replace the CPI inﬂation rates in CASH and CASF using the optimal policies and the real
exchange rate using the optimal risk sharing condition (which also holds under imperfect risk sharing
with σC =1and ξ =1 ). This shows that the consumption gaps are systematically closed.
Following efﬁcient shocks and perfect risk sharing, the optimal plan succeeds in eradicating
the social costs of deviations from the natural level of aggregate output and failures of PPP.
Consumption gaps are closed, consumer price levels remain constant and exchange rate is
ﬁxed. However, as we have already mentioned, there still exists a tradeoff between import
price and producer price stabilization.
We consider now the optimal dynamics of the exchange rate. Under LCP, the law of one
price does not hold and the expenditure-switching role of exchange rate is muted. Therefore, it
may seem quite appropriate to limit exchange rate variations in order to minimize the welfare
costs associated with these distortions, since those ﬂuctuations may not provide some compen-
sating gains in terms of stabilization. And this property is likely to prevail independently from
the originating shocks. The following result shows that a ﬁxed exchange rate regime is optimal
under certain conditions.35
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Result 6 Under the assumptions that of corollary 2, the optimal cooperative policy imposes a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime if and only if
i) shocks are efﬁcient, or
ii) shocks are inefﬁcient shocks and
μ
μ−1σC =1 .
Proof: Following efﬁcient shocks and the assumptions of Result 6, the optimal policy fully stabilizes
the consumer price levels and closes the consumption gaps. Furthermore, using equations CASH and
CASF, we see that the real exchange rate remains constant. So equation RER implies that the nominal
exchange rate is ﬁxed. Otherwise, reminding that the purchasing power parity holds in the ﬂexible
equilibrium without preference bias, we make use of the optimal risk sharing condition (which holds
under the assumptions of Result 6) to show that the optimal real exchange rate variations are matched
by the inﬂation rate differential if
μ
μ−1σC =1 .
Devereux and Engel [2003, 2006] provide similar conclusions as in Result 6 regarding the
optimality of ﬁxed exchange rate regime with efﬁcient shocks and LCP. Here, we extended the
analysis to a dynamic framework and more importantly to inefﬁcient shocks, showing that in
general, some degree of exchange rate ﬂexibility is needed while a ﬁxed exchange rate alloca-
tion could only arise with a speciﬁc combination of model parameters.
Note however that, in our framework, the optimality of ﬁxed exchange rate under LCP is
obtained under restrictive assumptions. In particular, introducing a preference bias, even with
complete ﬁnancial markets breaks the result: monetary authorities can have an impact on the
internal terms of trade and therefore face a tradeoff between the stabilization of the terms of
trade gaps which requires some exchange rate ﬂexibility and the stabilization of export margins
which moves inefﬁciently with exchange rate ﬂuctuations. With high degree of home bias,
optimal policy under LCP may even require more exchange rate adjustment than under PCP
in order to promote efﬁcient ﬂuctuations of real exchange rate with its more limited leverage
on the terms of trade.
4 Conclusion
This paper aimed at providing some stylized benchmarks for optimal monetary policy coop-
eration. We derived optimal targeting rules in some speciﬁc model conﬁgurations to illustrate
the role of imperfect exchange rate pass-through, incomplete international ﬁnancial markets36
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and home bias in consumption. Such simple cases should also prove a useful guide for the
analysis of optimal monetary policy cooperation in large DSGE models.
In particular, we show that the introduction of ”pricing-to-market” changes or extends pre-
vious results found in the literature. Under ”local-currency-pricing”, the monetary authorities
should target the consumer price index. A pure CPI inﬂation targeting strategy implements
the optimal outcome when shocks are efﬁcient. An analogous result holds under ”producer-
currency-pricing” concerning the optimality of PPI inﬂation targeting.
Moreover, a ﬁxed exchange rate regime may be optimal under LCP in order to alleviate
distortions associated with failures of the law of one price. Under PCP, a ﬂexible exchange
rate regime is optimal following efﬁcient shocks. However, the presence of cost-push shocks
reinforces the case for exchange rate management.
In order to explore the effect of imperfect risk sharing on optimal cooperation, the case of ﬁ-
nancial autarky under PCP shows that even with efﬁcient shocks the ﬁrst best allocation cannot
be achieved. This special case also provides some perspective on the role of the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution with incomplete ﬁnancial markets in shaping the optimal response of
international relative prices.
Our analysis reveals the lack of robustness of results about optimal monetary policy in open
economies and the importance of correctly modeling international ﬁnancial market structure
and the international price setting.37
ECB
Working Paper Series No 834
November 2007
References
S. Adj´ emian, M. Darracq Pari` es, and S. Smets. A quantitative perspective on optimal monetary
policy cooperation between the us and the euro area. mimeo, European Central Bank, 2007.
G. Benigno. Real exchange rate persistence and monetary policy rules. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 51(3):473–502, 2004.
G. Benigno and P. Benigno. Price stability in open economies. Review of Economic Studies, 70:
743–764, 2003.
G. Benigno and P. Benigno. Designing targeting rules for international monetary policy coop-
eration. Journal of Monetary Economics, 53:473–506, 2006.
P. Benigno. Price stability with imperfect ﬁnancial integration. Discussion Papers 2854, CEPR,
2001.
P. Benigno and M. Woodford. Linear-Quadratic Approximation of Optimal Policy Problems.
Working Paper 12672, NBER, November 2006.
R. Clarida, J. Gali, and M. Gertler. A simple framework for international monetary policy
analysis. Journal of monetary economics, 49(2):879–904, 2002.
G. Corsetti, L. Dedola, and S. Leduc. International risk sharing andthe transmission of pro-
ductivity shocks. International Finance Discussion Papers 826, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, February 2005.
G. Corsetti and P. Pesenti. Welfare and macroeconomic interdependance. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 116:421–445, 2001.
G. Corsetti and P. Pesenti. International dimensions of optimal monetary policy. Discussion
Papers 3349, CEPR, 2002.
M. Darracq Pari` es. Price Setting and Optimal Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective.i n
”Exchange Rates and Business Cycles: A New Open Economy View”, J.O. Hairault and
T.Sopraseuth, Eds. Routledge, 2003.
M. Devereux and C. Engel. Monetary Policy in the Open Economy Revisited: Exchange rate
Flexibility and Price Setting Behavior. Review of Economic Studies, 60:765–783, 2003.38
ECB
Working Paper Series No 834
November 2007
M. Devereux and C. Engel. Expenditure switching vs. real exchange rate stabilization: Com-
peting objectives for exchange rate policy. Working Paper 614, ECB, 2006.
E. Faia and T. Monacelli. Ramsey monetary policy and international relative prices. Working
Paper 344, European Central Bank, 2004.
M. Gali and T. Monacelli. Monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open econ-
omy. Review of Economic Studies, 72(3):707–734, 2005.
M. Giannoni and M. Woodford. Opitmal Interest-Rate Rules: I. General Theory. Working Paper
9419, NBER, January 2003a.
M. Giannoni and M. Woodford. Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: II. Applications. Working Paper
9420, NBER, January 2003b.
M. Obstfeld and K. Rogoff. Risk and exchange rates. Working Paper 6694, NBER, August 1998.
M. Obstfeld and K. Rogoff. Exchange rate dynamics redux. Journal of Political Economy, 103(3):
624–660, 2000.
M. Obstfeld and K. Rogoff. Global implications of self-oriented national monetary rules.
Quaterly Journal of Economics, 117:503–536, 2002.
J. Rotemberg and M. Woodford. An optimization-based econometric model for the evaluation
of monetary policy. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 12, 1997.
S. Schmitt-Grohe and S. Uribe. Optimal Inﬂation Stabilization in a Medium-Scale Macroeco-
nomic Model. Working Paper 11854, NBER, December 2005.
F. Smets and R. Wouters. Openness, imperfect exchange rate pass-through and monetary pol-
icy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 49(5):947–981, 2002.
A. Sutherland. International monetary policy coordination and ﬁnancial market integration.
Working paper 174, ECB, 2002.
M. Woodford. Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton University
Press, 2003.39
ECB
Working Paper Series No 834
November 2007
 European Central Bank Working Paper Series
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website
(http://www.ecb.europa.eu).
790  “Asset prices, exchange rates and the current account” by M. Fratzscher, L. Juvenal and L. Sarno, 
August 2007.
791  “Inquiries on dynamics of transition economy convergence in a two-country model” by J. Brůha and 
J. Podpiera, August 2007.
792  “Euro area market reactions to the monetary developments press release” by J. Cofﬁ  net and S. Gouteron, 
August 2007.
793  “Structural econometric approach to bidding in the main reﬁ  nancing operations of the Eurosystem” 
by N. Cassola, C. Ewerhart and C. Morana, August 2007.
794  “(Un)naturally low? Sequential Monte Carlo tracking of the US natural interest rate” by M. J. Lombardi and 
S. Sgherri, August 2007.
795  “Assessing the impact of a change in the composition of public spending: a DSGE approach” by R. Straub 
and I. Tchakarov, August 2007.
796  “The impact of exchange rate shocks on sectoral activity and prices in the euro area” by E. Hahn, 
August 2007.
797  “Joint estimation of the natural rate of interest, the natural rate of unemployment, expected inﬂ  ation, and 
potential output” by L. Benati and G. Vitale, August 2007.
798  “The transmission of US cyclical developments to the rest of the world” by S. Dées and I. Vansteenkiste, 
August 2007.
799  “Monetary policy shocks in a two-sector open economy: an empirical study” by R. Llaudes, August 2007.
800  “Is the corporate bond market forward looking?” by J. Hilscher, August 2007.
801  “Uncovered interest parity at distant horizons: evidence on emerging economies & nonlinearities” 
by A. Mehl and L. Cappiello, August 2007.
802  “Investigating time-variation in the marginal predictive power of the yield spread” by L. Benati and 
C. Goodhart, August 2007.
803  “Optimal monetary policy in an estimated DSGE for the euro area” by S. Adjemian, M. Darracq Pariès and 
S. Moyen, August 2007.
804  “Growth accounting for the euro area: a structural approach” by T. Proietti and A. Musso, August 2007.
805  “The pricing of risk in European credit and corporate bond markets” by A. Berndt and I. Obreja, 
August 2007.
806  “State-dependency and ﬁ  rm-level optimization: a contribution to Calvo price staggering” by P. McAdam and 
A. Willman, August 2007.
807  “Cross-border lending contagion in multinational banks” by A. Derviz and J. Podpiera, September 2007. 40
ECB
Working Paper Series No 834
November 2007
808  “Model misspeciﬁ  cation, the equilibrium natural interest rate and the equity premium” by O. Tristani, 
September 2007. 
809  “Is the New Keynesian Phillips curve ﬂ  at?” by K. Kuester, G. J. Müller und S. Stölting, September 2007.
810  “Inﬂ  ation persistence: euro area and new EU Member States” by M. Franta, B. Saxa and K. Šmídková, 
September 2007.
811  “Instability and nonlinearity in the euro area Phillips curve” by A. Musso, L. Stracca and D. van Dijk, 
September 2007.
812   “The uncovered return parity condition” by L. Cappiello and R. A. De Santis, September 2007.
813   “The role of the exchange rate for adjustment in boom and bust episodes” by R. Martin, L. Schuknecht and 
I. Vansteenkiste, September 2007.
814   “Choice of currency in bond issuance and the international role of currencies” by N. Siegfried, 
E. Simeonova and C. Vespro, September 2007.
815   “Do international portfolio investors follow ﬁ  rms’ foreign investment decisions?” by R. A. De Santis and 
P. Ehling, September 2007.
816   “The role of credit aggregates and asset prices in the transmission mechanism: a comparison between the 
euro area and the US” by S. Kaufmann and M. T. Valderrama, September 2007.
817   “Convergence and anchoring of yield curves in the euro area” by M. Ehrmann, M. Fratzscher, 
R. S. Gürkaynak and E. T. Swanson, October 2007.
818   “Is time ripe for price level path stability?” by V. Gaspar, F. Smets and D. Vestin, October 2007.
819   “Proximity and linkages among coalition participants: a new voting power measure applied to the 
International Monetary Fund” by J. Reynaud, C. Thimann and L. Gatarek, October 2007.
820   “What do we really know about ﬁ  scal sustainability in the EU? A panel data diagnostic” by A. Afonso and 
C. Rault, October 2007.
821   “Social value of public information: testing the limits to transparency” by M. Ehrmann and M. Fratzscher, 
October 2007.
822   “Exchange rate pass-through to trade prices: the role of non-linearities and asymmetries” by M. Bussière, 
October 2007.
823   “Modelling Ireland’s exchange rates: from EMS to EMU” by D. Bond and M. J. Harrison and E. J. O’Brien, 
October 2007.
824   ”Evolving U.S. monetary policy and the decline of inﬂ  ation predictability” by L. Benati and P. Surico, 
October 2007.
825   “What can probability forecasts tell us about inﬂ  ation risks?” by J. A. García and A. Manzanares, 
October 2007.
826   “Risk sharing, ﬁ  nance and institutions in international portfolios” by M. Fratzscher and J. Imbs, 
October 2007.
827  “How is real convergence driving nominal convergence in the new EU Member States?” 
by S. M. Lein-Rupprecht, M. A. León-Ledesma and C. Nerlich, November 2007.41
ECB
Working Paper Series No 834
November 2007
828   “Potential output growth in several industrialised countries: a comparison” by C. Cahn and 
A. Saint-Guilhem, November 2007.
829   “Modelling inﬂ  ation in China: a regional perspective” by A Mehrotra, T. Peltonen and A. Santos Rivera, 
November 2007.
830   “The term structure of euro area break-even inﬂ  ation rates: the impact of seasonality” by J. Ejsing, 
J. A. García and T. Werner, November 2007.
831  “Hierarchical Markov normal mixture models with applications to ﬁ  nancial asset returns” by J. Geweke and 
G. Amisano, November 2007.
832   “The yield curve and macroeconomic dynamics” by P. Hördahl, O. Tristani and D. Vestin, November 2007.
833   “Explaining and forecasting euro area exports: which competitiveness indicator performs best?” 
by M. Ca’ Zorzi and B. Schnatz, November 2007.
834   “International frictions and optimal monetary policy cooperation: analytical solutions” 
by M. Darracq Pariès, November 2007.Date: 15 Nov, 2007 14:40:29;Format: (420.00 x 297.00 mm);Output Profile: SPOT IC300;Preflight: Failed!